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____________ 
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
  This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
2 
 
CHAGARES, Circuit Judge. 
Appellant Steven Lynch appeals from his conviction after a jury trial for tax 
evasion in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7202.  Lynch raises a profusion of claims challenging 
nearly every aspect of the trial, including that (1) much of the evidence was inadmissible, 
(2) his Confrontation Clause rights were violated, (3) the Government failed to prove that 
Lynch violated § 7202; (4) the Government engaged in prosecutorial misconduct; (5) the 
District Court’s jury instructions were erroneous; (6) the Government withheld evidence 
in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); and (7) the District Court’s 
sentence was improper.  Because these arguments lack merit, we will affirm.  
I. 
We write for the parties and so recount only the facts necessary to our decision.  
Since 2001, Lynch — along with his minority partners — owned and operated the 
Iceoplex at Southpointe LLC, a facility that included an ice skating rink, indoor field, 
health club, and sports bar (collectively “Iceoplex”).  The Iceoplex originally leased the 
space for the sports bar, Jay’s Sports Bar and Grill, but Lynch and two partners acquired 
Jay’s in 2006.  Lynch also owned Alder Street Management, which operated out of the 
Iceoplex offices.  In his capacity as either president or treasurer of these entities, Lynch 
had near-total authority over financial decisions.  Significantly, Lynch exclusively 
prepared, signed, and filed with the IRS the entities’ quarterly employment tax returns.  
Lynch was accordingly the “responsible person” for collecting and paying the entities’ 
“trust fund” taxes, meaning that he had the duty to withhold income, Social Security, and 
Medicare taxes from the entities’ employees and to pay them to the IRS.  Although the 
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entities withheld these taxes, starting in 2003 they failed timely to remit them to the IRS.  
At times during the over decade-long period during which the entities failed to pay over 
their trust fund taxes, Lynch directed the payment of wages to the entities’ employees 
through shell companies, including SRA Services LLC and SRA Employee Services 
LLC.   
In July 2014, Lynch was indicted on ten counts of willfully failing to pay over 
taxes withheld from the wages of employees paid through SRA Services and SRA 
Employee Services during the quarters ending in 2008–2010, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 
7202.  In December 2015, a superseding indictment was issued charging eighteen 
additional counts of willfully failing to pay over withheld taxes paid through SRA 
Employee Services, the Iceoplex at Southpointe, LLC, Alder Street Management 
Company, and Jay’s Sports Bar and Restaurant, Inc., during the quarters ending in 2011–
2015.  A jury convicted Lynch of 16 counts, consisting of all the § 7202 charges from the 
second quarter of 2012 and later, save the second quarter of 2014 relating to Alder Street 
Management.  At sentencing, the District Court, considering uncharged and acquitted 
conduct, determined that Lynch’s scheme resulted in a tax loss of $2,885,898, yielding a 
base offense level of 22 and a United States Sentencing Guidelines range of 41 to 51 
months of imprisonment.  The District Court sentenced Lynch to 48 months of 
imprisonment followed by 36 months of supervised release and ordered him to pay 
restitution of $793,145 (relating to the tax loss from the quarters for which Lynch was 
convicted), a $75,000 fine, and a $1,600 special assessment.  Lynch timely appealed. 
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II.1 
A.  
Lynch challenges the admissibility of the summary charts that the Government 
introduced into evidence, asserting that they relied on inadmissible underlying 
documents, were not accompanied by the testimony of the individual who prepared them 
in the first instance, were improperly admitted through a lay witness, and were 
inaccurate.  As explained below, these contentions are meritless.2  
Federal Rule of Evidence 1006 permits a party to “use a summary, chart, or 
calculation to prove the content of voluminous writings . . . that cannot be conveniently 
examined in court,” where the summary would be helpful to the jury.  See United States 
v. Bansal, 663 F.3d 634, 668 (3d Cir. 2011).  Rule 1006 summaries are admissible only if 
they rely upon admissible materials, United States v. Pelullo, 964 F.2d 193, 204 (3d Cir. 
1992), and must be supported by a foundation showing that the exhibit is an accurate 
summary of the underlying materials, Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 295 
F.2d 292, 301 (3d Cir. 1961).  Testimony concerning the “authenticity and accuracy” of a 
summary may be provided by a person who supervised its preparation or carefully 
reviewed its content.  United States v. Scales, 594 F.2d 558, 563 (6th Cir. 1979). 
                                              
1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231 and we have 
appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742. 
2 We review de novo the District Court’s interpretation of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence, but assess for abuse of discretion its decisions concerning the admissibility of 
evidence.  United States v. Serafini, 233 F.3d 758, 768 n.14 (3d Cir. 2000). 
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1.  
Lynch argues that the underlying IRS and bank records — which he admits 
qualify as business records for the purpose of Rule 803(6)’s hearsay exception — were 
never authenticated and thus could not serve as the basis for the summaries.  At the start 
of trial, however, Lynch consented to the documents’ admission into evidence.  Lynch 
cannot now complain that the Government did not thereafter waste its argument time 
reestablishing the foundation of already admitted documents.  
2.  
The Government’s summary exhibits were compiled by IRS agent Paul Bauer 
over the course of his investigation.  In presenting its summary exhibits under Rule 1006, 
however, the Government offered a different IRS agent (Agent Lisa Gapsky), whom 
Lynch asserts was unfamiliar with the reasons for why certain information was or was not 
included in the summaries.  Lynch argues that Rule 1006 requires that the summary 
preparer be made available to testify.  Rule 1006 contains no such requirement.  Gapsky 
verified every data entry back to its underlying document and confirmed that the 
formulas were operating correctly in the charts, which was sufficient to establish that the 
summaries were accurate.  See Scales, 594 F.2d at 563.  Nor did Gapsky need to be an 
expert in order to introduce the summaries, as no special expertise beyond that which is 
expected of an IRS agent was needed to accomplish this task.  See Asplundh Mfg. Div. v. 
Benton Harbor Eng’g, 57 F.3d 1190, 1201 (3d Cir. 1995).  
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3.  
Lynch next challenges the accuracy of Exhibit G-94, which identifies the net 
withdrawals from six Lynch-controlled bank accounts.  To ensure that the chart captured 
only expenditures going to third parties, it cross-referenced each payment against the 
other five accounts, to see if the payment was just a reshuffling of assets.  On cross-
examination, Lynch identified other related accounts that were not included in the chart.  
The District Court denied Lynch’s request to reject the exhibit, explaining that Gapsky 
had sufficiently shown that the exhibit accurately summarized the six documents and that 
the jury could determine how much credibility to accord the summary.   
A Rule 1006 summary chart need not accurately reflect all the facts in the case; it 
merely must accurately represent the facts that it purports to summarize.  “So long as they 
are accurate, however, such summaries may present only one party’s side of the case.”  2 
McCormick on Evid. § 241 (7th ed.).  The fact that G-94 did not include all the related 
accounts does not undermine its admissibility because it accurately reflected the accounts 
it did include.  It was up to Lynch, on cross-examination, to show the jury that there was 
more to the story, and he effectively did so.  See, e.g., United States v. Nivica, 887 F.2d 
1110, 1125–26 (1st Cir. 1989) (concluding that summaries’ failure to reflect “total 
financial activity” “affect[s] . . . weight rather than the admissibility” and that “if there 
were gaps in the charts, the defense . . . had every opportunity to exploit them”). 
B.  
Lynch argues next that his confrontation rights were violated when the 
Government was permitted to present the summaries based on Gapsky’s testimony, 
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without making Agent Bauer available for testimony.  Lynch did not raise this issue with 
the District Court, so we review for plain error.  See United States v. Lopez, 650 F.3d 
952, 959 (3d Cir. 2011).  “Plain error exists only when (1) an error was committed (2) 
that was plain, and (3) that affected the defendant’s substantial rights.”  Id. (quoting 
United States v. Lessner, 498 F.3d 185, 192 (3d Cir. 2007)).  A “plain” error is one that is 
“clear” or “obvious.”  United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993).  Even upon 
finding a plain error, a court of appeals has discretion whether to grant relief and “should 
correct a plain forfeited error affecting substantial rights if the error ‘seriously affect[s] 
the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.’”  Id. at 736 (alteration 
in original) (quoting United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160 (1936)).   
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment provides that, “[i]n all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses 
against him.”  A witness is any individual who bears testimony against the defendant, and 
such testimony can be contained in any functional equivalent of in-court testimony.  See 
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004).  To fall within the ambit of the 
Confrontation Clause, then, a proposed exhibit must constitute an out-of-court statement 
containing testimonial hearsay, meaning that it was “a ‘solemn declaration or affirmation 
made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact;’ and . . . was made primarily 
for the purpose of ‘prov[ing] past events potentially relevant to later criminal 
prosecution.’”  United States v. Stimler, 864 F.3d 253, 272 (3d Cir. 2017) (footnote 
omitted) (first quoting Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 310 (2009); then 
quoting Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 361 (2011)).  Lynch asserts that the 
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summaries — documents created out of court and in anticipation of the trial, introduced 
for the purposes of proving a fact — constitute testimonial hearsay and must be testified 
to by Agent Bauer.3 
The resolution of this issue turns on the fact-specific question of whether the 
summary document itself was a testimonial statement; that is, whether it simply 
consolidated data from other admissible documents and ran basic calculations on that 
data, or whether instead it was based on the preparer’s own assumptions and subjective 
choices about what data is relevant.4  In this Circuit, a district court’s finding that the 
exhibits qualified under Rule 1006 is itself a determination that they are not infected with 
the preparer’s own subjective views.  Prior to permitting the use of a summary document 
under Rule 1006, the district court must assure that “the summation accurately 
summarizes the materials involved by not referring to information not contained in the 
original.”  Pritchard, 295 F.2d at 300–01; see also Eichorn v. AT&T Corp., 484 F.3d 644, 
650 (3d Cir. 2007).  The District Court’s Rule 1006 finding would tend to indicate that 
the summary documents were not independent statements or conclusions concerning the 
data in the original documents. 
                                              
3 The IRS and bank records that underlie the summaries are non-testimonial and so 
on their own do not trigger the Confrontation Clause.  Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56. 
4 Indeed, two of our sister courts have concluded that a summary that merely 
consolidates or reformulates the underlying evidence cannot be considered a statement in 
its own right, and so does not fall within the ambit of Confrontation Clause.  See, e.g., 
United States v. Davis, 531 F. App’x 65, 69 (2d Cir. 2013) (concluding that edited video 
footage was not testimonial because “the act of editing the video is not an out-of-court 
statement at all”); United States v. Keck, 643 F.3d 789, 796 (10th Cir. 2011) (holding that 
copying information from underlying non-testimonial records does “not constitute a 
Confrontation Clause violation”). 
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We need not, however, firmly conclude whether the summaries here fell on the 
wrong side of the subjectivity line because the resolution of that issue turns on factual 
determinations about which reasonable minds could differ.  Under plain error review, it is 
certainly not clear that Lynch’s Confrontation Clause right was violated by allowing 
Gapsky to testify to exhibits that were not obviously statements in their own right.  
Accordingly, we deny Lynch’s claim. 
C.  
Lynch next argues that the Government failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
the elements that Lynch asserts are required to find him guilty under § 7202.  We 
disagree.  Challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence are assessed by viewing “the 
record in the light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether any rational 
trier of fact could have found proof of guilt[] beyond a reasonable doubt.”  United States 
v. Caraballo-Rodriguez, 726 F.3d 418, 430 (3d Cir. 2013) (en banc) (alteration in 
original) (quoting United States v. Brodie, 403 F.3d 123, 133 (3d Cir. 2005)).   
1.  
Section 7202 provides that “[a]ny person required under this title to collect, 
account for, and pay over any tax imposed by this title who willfully fails to collect or 
truthfully account for and pay over such tax shall . . . be guilty of a felony.”  26 U.S.C § 
7202.  Accordingly, the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 
(1) Lynch was a person required to “collect, account for, and pay over” the firms’ 
employment taxes, (2) he failed to do so, and (3) that failure was willful.  Whether an 
individual is a “responsible person” required to pay over the withheld taxes “is a matter 
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of status, duty, or authority, not knowledge.”  Greenberg v. United States, 46 F.3d 239, 
243 (3d Cir. 1994) (quoting Brounstein v. United States, 979 F.2d 952, 954 (3d Cir. 
1992)).5  In reaching this determination, we have considered the following factors:  
(1) contents of the corporate bylaws, (2) ability to sign checks on the company’s 
bank account, (3) signature on the employer’s federal quarterly and other tax 
returns, (4) payment of other creditors in lieu of the United States, (5) identity of 
officers, directors, and principal stockholders in the firm, (6) identity of individuals 
in charge of hiring and discharging employees, and (7) identity of individuals in 
charge of the firm’s financial affairs. 
 
Id. (quoting Brounstein, 979 F.2d at 954–55).  There is no requirement that the defendant 
meet all these factors in order to be deemed a responsible person.  See, e.g., United States 
v. DeMuro, 677 F.3d 550, 559, 566 (3d Cir. 2012) (considering only four factors).   
“Willfulness in a tax evasion case is ‘a voluntary, intentional violation of a known 
legal duty.’”  Id. at 557 (quoting Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 201 (1991)).  
Thus, if a defendant can show “that he had a good faith belief that he was not violating 
the tax code, regardless of whether that belief was objectively reasonable, he has 
established that he did not act willfully.”  Id.  The burden remains on the Government to 
disprove the defendant’s good faith.  Cheek, 498 U.S. at 202. 
2.  
Lynch first claims that he is not a “person” under Title 26 because that term is 
limited to the definition included in § 7343, which does not include an “individual.”  We 
                                              
5 The Court in Greenberg dealt with 26 U.S.C § 6672 — the civil corollary to 
§ 7202 — but the relevant language of the two statutes is nearly identical, see Slodov v. 
United States, 436 U.S. 238, 245 (1978) (“[Section] 7202 . . . tracks the wording of 
§ 6672 . . . .”), and this Court has applied the test set out in Greenberg to § 7202, see 
United States v. DeMuro, 677 F.3d 550, 559 (3d Cir. 2012). 
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have explicitly rejected this argument as frivolous.  United States v. Karlin, 785 F.2d 90, 
91 (3d Cir. 1986) (discussing § 7203, which mirrors § 7202’s language); see also United 
States v. Latham, 754 F.2d 747, 750 (7th Cir. 1985) (rejecting as “inane” defendant’s 
argument “that 26 U.S.C. § 7343 defining ‘person’ does not include natural persons”).  
Because Lynch is “an individual,” 26 U.S.C. § 7701, he is a person under Title 26.  
3.   
Much of Lynch’s argument that the Government failed to show that he was a 
responsible person relies on his baseless contention that the IRS filings and bank records 
were improperly admitted into evidence.  Those documents clearly showed that Iceoplex 
and Alder Street owed a substantial amount of trust fund taxes during the indictment 
period, that Lynch had signature authority over 40 of the 50 bank accounts associated 
with the entities, and exclusively signed and filed quarterly tax returns for SRA 
Employee Services (as Treasurer) and Alder Street, Iceoplex, and Jay’s (as President).  
Other evidence at trial overwhelmingly showed that Lynch had near-total control over the 
entities’ finances.  This included testimony that Lynch admitted that he determined 
financial policy.  This is substantial evidence that a rational trier of fact could have relied 
upon to establish proof of control beyond a reasonable doubt.  
4.  
 Lynch argues that § 7202 does not contain within it any language specifying a due 
date and so argues that his late payments do not alone suffice to establish that he failed to 
pay over the taxes.  This argument fails on its face.  Section 7202 applies to taxes 
“imposed by this title,” and § 6151 makes clear that “when a return of tax is required 
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under this title or regulations, the person required to make such return . . . shall pay such 
tax at the time and place fixed for filing the return.”  See, e.g., United States v. Quinn, 
No. 09-cv20075 (JWL), 2011 WL 382369, at *1 (D. Kan. Feb. 3, 2011) (“[A] ‘failure to 
pay over’ necessarily incorporates the concept of a deadline, as the failure must be 
measured as of some particular time.”), aff’d, 566 F. App’x 659 (10th Cir. 2014).  Thus, 
where a payment is late, the responsible person has by definition failed to pay it over and 
if that failure was willful, that person has violated § 7202. 
5.  
 Ample evidence also existed to allow the jury to conclude beyond a reasonable 
doubt that Lynch’s failure to pay over the taxes when due was not in good faith, but 
instead was a willful attempt to avoid paying as much of the amount owed as possible.  
This included evidence that Lynch:  was repeatedly told by the IRS that the entities’ 
employment taxes were unpaid and that failure to pay subjected him to criminal liability, 
paid off a substantial portion of unpaid taxes the day after hearing he was the subject of a 
grand jury investigation, shifted payment structures and maintained low account balances 
to avoid IRS levies, and directed payments to employees, creditors, and himself while 
failing to pay the overdue trust fund taxes.  See, e.g., DeMuro, 677 F.3d at 558–59 
(noting evidence of spending while taxes are due “belies [defendants’] assertions that 
they were sincerely attempting to pay their back taxes as expeditiously as possible”); 
United States v. McKee, 506 F.3d 225, 248–49 (3d Cir. 2007) (explaining that evidence 
that “a defendant became aware of the tax improprieties inherent in [his] conduct” shows 
willfulness); see also, e.g., United States v. Boisseau, 841 F.3d 1122, 1127 (10th Cir. 
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2016) (finding evidence of willfulness where defendant “alter[ed] the method of 
compensation to defeat a levy”).  This was more than sufficient evidence to support the 
jury’s finding of willfulness beyond a reasonable doubt. 
III. 
Lynch next asserts that the Government engaged in various forms of misconduct 
throughout the trial.  A prosecutor’s comments may rise to a constitutional violation 
where “in context and in light of the entire trial,” Moore v. Morton, 255 F.3d 95, 107 (3d 
Cir. 2001), they “so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction 
a denial of due process,” Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974).  Because 
Lynch did not raise a prosecutorial misconduct claim below, we review for plain error.   
A.  
Lynch alleges that although he is not an “employer” so does not personally owe 
taxes or employ employees, the Government made statements implying that Lynch 
personally owed taxes or employed people.  However, as a “responsible person,” Lynch 
— although not the employer — was responsible for the collection and payment of the 
trust fund taxes.  It was no misrepresentation for the Government to argue that Lynch had 
a duty to pay these taxes or that he failed to do so.  Likewise, because Lynch was a 
controlling owner, it is perhaps inaccurate, but not misleading or unfair, to describe the 
entities’ employees as Lynch’s employees.  See Rolan v. Coleman, 680 F.3d 311, 325 (3d 
Cir. 2012).  Nor did the Government argue to the jury that Lynch was the employer.  It 
argued, and the evidence conclusively shows, that Lynch was the responsible person.  In 
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context, any misleading comments did not render the trial unfair.  Lynch cannot show 
plain error because the statements did not affect his substantial rights.  
B.  
Lynch also contends that his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination was 
violated when Special Agent Lauth, a Government witness, testified that after telling 
Lynch that he was the subject of a Grand Jury investigation, Lynch replied that he did not 
want to talk and wanted an attorney.  Lynch argues that this revelation implied to the jury 
that he was guilty.  Lynch did not object at trial, and his claim fails.  
The Government did not intentionally elicit this testimony.  Rather, the record 
reflects that the Government presented Agent Lauth as a witness for the purpose of 
showing only that Lynch was informed that he was the subject of the Grand Jury 
investigation, but that Lauth gave a narrative answer.  The Government asked no 
follow-up questions, and although it discussed Lauth’s testimony during its summation, 
did not mention Lynch’s refusal to talk or request for counsel.  In any event, Lynch again 
cannot show that the error was plain or that it affected his substantial rights.  
IV. 
Lynch next challenges that the District Court’s jury instructions improperly:  (1) 
defined “person” to include an individual, (2) read a due date into § 7202, (3) did not 
require the Government to prove that Lynch was under a legal duty to pay over the taxes; 
(4) did not require the Government to affirmatively disprove the absence of good faith; 
and (5) permitted the jury to find that Lynch was a “responsible person” if he had the 
“authority required to exercise significant control . . . regardless of whether that 
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individual exercises such control in fact.”  Appendix (“App.”) 1255.  “We review the 
legal accuracy of a district court’s jury instructions de novo.  Absent an affirmative 
misstatement of the applicable law, our review is for an abuse of discretion.”  United 
States v. Maury, 695 F.3d 227, 261 (3d Cir. 2012) (citation omitted).  Where the claim 
was not raised below, we review for plain error.  United States v. Xavier, 2 F.3d 1281, 
1287 (3d Cir. 1993). 
As we have explained, Lynch’s first two contentions are meritless.  His third 
contention fails, too, because the District Court properly instructed the jury on the 
Government’s burden.  See App. 1250.   
His fourth claim was not raised below and is unavailing.  The Government bears 
the burden of proving willfulness and so its failure to negate a good faith defense 
amounts to a failure to prove that the defendant knew of, and intentionally violated, his 
duty to pay taxes.  These are not two separate elements that the Government must prove, 
but two sides of the same coin.  See Cheek, 498 U.S. at 201–02 (identifying the 
Government’s burden to prove willfulness, then noting that “carrying this burden” 
requires that the Government disprove the defendant’s good faith, because such a claim is 
inconsistent with willfulness).  The District Court’s instructions adequately stated this 
standard. 
His fifth claim fares no better.  He argues, again for the first time on appeal, that 
this Court requires a finding of an actual exercise of significant control to be held liable 
as a responsible person.  But we have held that whether someone is a responsible person 
“is a matter of status, duty, or authority,” Greenberg, 46 F.3d at 243 (quoting Brounstein, 
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979 F.2d at 954), and a number of the factors that we consider depend on authority or 
status, not action, see id. (considering contents of bylaws, ability to sign checks, identity 
of officers, identity of individuals with power to hire or discharge, and identity of 
individual in charge of finances).  The instruction was not plainly erroneous and given 
the substantial evidence of Lynch’s exclusive control over the entities’ finances, any error 
did not affect substantial rights.  
V. 
Lynch’s penultimate claim is that the prosecution violated Brady by failing to turn 
over the Special Agent Report (“SAR”) authored by Agent Bauer, who did not testify at 
trial.  Lynch asserts his belief that the report contains favorable evidence “that would 
have bolstered Appellant’s good faith defense, impeachment evidence that would have 
been valuable to impeach the testimony of the government’s witnesses and evidence that 
would have helped the defense team show the IRS investigation was not thorough.”  
Lynch Br. 69–70.  We review de novo the District Court’s legal conclusions and review 
its factual findings for clear error.  United States v. Ramos, 27 F.3d 65, 67 (3d Cir. 1994). 
To make out a Brady claim, Lynch must show that (1) the “evidence at issue [was] 
favorable” to him (that is, was exculpatory or impeaching), (2) the “evidence [was] 
suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently,” and (3) he was prejudiced 
because the suppressed evidence was “material.”  Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281–
82 (1999); Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 432–34 (1995).  Evidence is material “if there 
is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result 
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of the proceeding would have been different.”  United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 
682 (1985).  Lynch cannot show that the SAR report was favorable or material.   
All the information underlying the SAR report was disclosed to the defense, save 
for Bauer’s own theories of the case and prosecution recommendations.  Lynch’s good 
faith defense depends on his own mental state at the time of the offenses, so Bauer’s ex 
post views on the matter have no relevance to that determination.  Nor could the report, 
which reflected only Bauer’s recommendations, have been used as impeachment 
evidence, given that Bauer did not testify.  A witness generally may not be impeached 
with another person’s statement.  See, e.g., 28 Wright & Gold, Fed. Prac. & Proc. Evid., 
§ 6203 (2d ed. 2012) (collecting cases).  Finally, there is no basis for Lynch’s claim that 
the report would show that the IRS’s investigation was not thorough.  A defendant must 
“raise[] a colorable claim” that undisclosed documents created by government agents 
“contained exculpatory material that was material to their defense” and was not included 
in disclosed documents.  Ramos, 27 F.3d at 71.  If the IRS’s investigation was sloppy, 
Lynch should have made this argument by reference to information contained in or left 
out of the underlying documents.  Lynch’s unsupported belief that such exculpatory 
material may be found in the SAR is insufficient, as “[w]e think it unwise to infer the 
existence of Brady material based upon speculation alone.”  Id. at 71.  But even if the 
SAR report could cast doubt on the IRS’s investigation, the evidence at trial supplied 
almost incontrovertible proof of Lynch’s guilt.  There is therefore no reasonable 
probability that an attack on the skill with which the IRS undertook the investigation 
would have resulted in a different outcome. 
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VI. 
Lynch’s final contention is that the District Court erred in concluding that the tax 
loss for sentencing purposes was $2,885,898, which included within it unpaid taxes from 
quarters for which Lynch was acquitted and not charged with any offense, and payments 
that were paid late.  Lynch asserts that the District Court’s inclusion of these sums in the 
tax loss violated his Due Process rights and his right to trial by jury.  We disagree.   
We review factual findings, such as the calculation of a tax loss, for clear error, 
United States v. Roman, 121 F.3d 136, 140 (3d Cir. 1997), and the District Court’s 
interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines, including its definition of what constitutes 
“loss,” de novo, United States v. Fumo, 655 F.3d 288, 309 (3d Cir. 2011).  “In 
determining the total tax loss attributable to the offense . . . all conduct violating the tax 
laws should be considered as part of the same course of conduct or common scheme or 
plan unless the evidence demonstrates that the conduct is clearly unrelated.”  U.S.S.G. § 
2T1.1 cmt. n.2.  Here, the District Court considered the related conduct in this case, 
which was Lynch’s failure to pay over taxes to the IRS across multiple years, beginning 
prior to the quarters for which Lynch was convicted and continuing after the indictment 
period.  This finding was amply supported by the record.  Because “a jury’s verdict of 
acquittal does not prevent the sentencing court from considering conduct underlying the 
acquitted charge, so long as that conduct has been proved by a preponderance of the 
evidence,” the District Court’s reliance on uncharged and acquitted conduct was 
appropriate.  United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 157 (1997); see also, e.g., United 
States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 567–68 (3d Cir. 2007) (en banc) (“Facts relevant to 
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application of the Guidelines — whether or not they constitute a ‘separate offense’. . . do 
not implicate the rights to a jury trial and proof beyond a reasonable doubt.”). 
Lynch next argues that the tax loss should actually have been zero, given that he 
always intended to pay the taxes, or alternatively should have been reduced by the 
amount of his late payments.  As we already explained, § 7202 is violated when the taxes 
are willfully not paid as of the time that the filing is due.  The Guidelines, for their part, 
are clear that for willful failure-to-pay offenses, “the tax loss is the amount of tax that the 
taxpayer owed and did not pay” and furthermore that “[t]he tax loss is not reduced by any 
payment of the tax subsequent to the commission of the offense.”  § 2T1.1(c)(3) & (c)(5).  
Accordingly, the tax loss is properly calculated based on whatever Lynch owed and 
willfully did not pay when the applicable filings were due, at which point the offense had 
been committed.  Subsequent payments cannot retroactively reduce that tax loss. 
Lynch’s final sentencing-related challenge appears to be that the District Court’s 
imposition of a 48 month sentence of imprisonment was substantively unreasonable 
because, in light of Lynch’s background, the suspension of Lynch’s law license as a 
result of his conviction was punishment enough.  We review a sentence’s substantive 
reasonableness for abuse of discretion and “must ‘give due deference to the district 
court’s determination that the § 3553(a) factors, on a whole,’ justify the sentence.”  
United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 568 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc) (quoting Gall v. 
United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007)).  The District Court’s sentence was within the 
Guidelines range of 41 to 51 month of imprisonment and was supported by explicit 
reference to Lynch’s privileged background and the § 3553(a) factors.  See Rita v. United 
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States, 551 U.S. 338, 347 (2007) (holding that within-Guidelines sentences may be 
afforded a “presumption of reasonableness”).  Lynch has not cited any law in support of 
his position that the loss of a professional license is a sufficient substitute for 
incarceration.  The District Court’s sentence was reasonable.6 
VII. 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
                                              
6 We have considered Lynch’s remaining claims and find they are without merit 
and require no further discussion. 
